1 | \chapter{Introduction}
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2 |
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3 | All modern programming languages provide three high-level containers (collections): array, linked-list, and string.
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4 | Often array is part of the programming language, while linked-list is built from (recursive) pointer types, and string from a combination of array and linked-list.
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5 | For all three types, languages supply varying degrees of high-level mechanism for manipulating these objects at the bulk level and at the component level, such as array copy, slicing and iterating.
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6 |
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7 | This work looks at extending these three foundational container types in the programming language \CFA, which is a new dialect of the C programming language.
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8 | A primary goal of \CFA~\cite{Cforall} is 99\% backward compatibility with C, while maintaining a look and feel that matches with C programmer experience and intuition.
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9 | This goal requires ``thinking inside the box'' to engineer new features that ``work and play'' with C and its massive legacy code-base.
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10 | An additional goal is balancing good performance with safety.
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11 |
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12 |
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13 | \section{Array}
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14 |
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15 | An array provides a homogeneous container with $O(1)$ access to elements using subscripting.
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16 | The array size can be static, dynamic but fixed after creation, or dynamic and variable after creation.
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17 | For static and dynamic-fixed, an array can be stack allocated, while dynamic-variable requires the heap.
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18 | Because array layout has contiguous components, subscripting is a computation (some form of pointer arithmetic).
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19 |
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20 |
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21 | \section{Linked list}
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22 |
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23 | A linked-list provides a homogeneous container often with $O(log N)$/$O(N)$ access to elements using successor and predecessor operations that normally involve pointer chasing.
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24 | Subscripting by value is sometimes available, \eg hash table.
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25 | Linked types are normally dynamically sized by adding/removing nodes using link fields internal or external to the elements (nodes).
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26 | If a programming language allows pointer to stack storage, linked-list types can be allocated on the stack;
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27 | otherwise, elements are heap allocated with explicitly/implicitly managed.
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28 |
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29 |
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30 | \section{String}
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31 |
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32 | A string provides a dynamic array of homogeneous elements, where the elements are often human-readable characters.
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33 | What differentiates a string from other types in that its operations work on blocks of elements for scanning and changing, \eg @index@ and @substr@.
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34 | Subscripting individual elements is often available.
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35 | Therefore, the cost of string operations is less important than the power of the operations to accomplish complex text manipulation, \eg search, analysing, composing, and decomposing.
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36 | The dynamic nature of a string means storage is normally heap allocated but often implicitly managed, even in unmanaged languages.
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37 | Often string management is separate from heap management, \ie strings roll their own heap.
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38 |
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39 |
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40 | \section{Motivation}
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41 |
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42 | The primary motivation for this work is two fold:
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43 | \begin{enumerate}[leftmargin=*]
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44 | \item
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45 | These three aspects of C are extremely difficult to understand, teach, and get right because they are correspondingly extremely low level.
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46 | Providing higher-level versions of these containers in \CFA is a major component of the primary goal.
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47 | \item
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48 | These three aspects of C cause the greatest safety issues because there are few or no safe guards when a programmer misunderstands or misuses these features~\cite{Elliott18, Blache19, Ruef19, Oorschot23}.
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49 | Estimates suggest 50\%~\cite{Mendio24} of total reported open-source vulnerabilities occur in C resulting from errors using these facilities (memory errors), providing the major hacker attack-vectors.
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50 | \end{enumerate}
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51 | Both White House~\cite{WhiteHouse24} and DARPA~\cite{DARPA24} recently released a recommendation to move away from C and \CC, because of cybersecurity threats exploiting vulnerabilities in these older languages.
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52 | Hardening these three types goes a long way to make the majority of C programs safer.
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53 |
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54 |
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55 | While multiple new languages purport to be systems languages replacing C, the reality is that rewriting massive C code-bases is impractical and a non-starter if the new runtime uses garage collection.
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56 | Furthermore, these languages must still interact with the underlying C operating system through fragile, type-unsafe, interlanguage-communication.
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57 | Switching to \CC is equally impractical as its complex and interdependent type-system (\eg objects, inheritance, templates) means idiomatic \CC code is difficult to use from C, and C programmers must expend significant effort learning \CC.
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58 | Hence, rewriting and retraining costs for these languages can be prohibitive for companies with a large C software-base (Google, Apple, Microsoft, Amazon, AMD, Nvidia).
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59 |
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60 |
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61 | \subsection{C?}
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62 |
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63 | Like many established programming languages, C has a standards committee and multiple ANSI/\-ISO language manuals~\cite{C99,C11,C18,C23}.
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64 | However, most programming languages are only partially explained by standard's manuals.
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65 | When it comes to explaining how C works, the definitive source is the @gcc@ compiler, which is mimicked by other C compilers, such as Clang~\cite{clang}.
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66 | Often other C compilers must mimic @gcc@ because a large part of the C library (runtime) system (@glibc@ on Linux) contains @gcc@ features.
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67 | While some key aspects of C need to be explained by quoting from the language reference manual, to illustrate definite program semantics, my approach in this thesis is to devise a program, whose behaviour exercises a point at issue, and shows its behaviour.
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68 | These example programs show
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69 | \begin{itemize}[leftmargin=*]
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70 | \item if the compiler accepts or rejects certain syntax,
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71 | \item prints output to buttress a claim of behaviour,
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72 | \item or executes without triggering any embedded assertions testing pre/post-assertions or invariants.
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73 | \end{itemize}
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74 | This work has been tested across @gcc@ versions 8--12 and clang version 10 running on ARM, AMD, and Intel architectures.
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75 | Any discovered anomalies among compilers or versions is discussed.
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76 | In all case, it is never clear whether the \emph{truth} lies in the compiler or the C standard.
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77 |
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78 |
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79 | \section{Contributions}
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80 |
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81 | \subsection{Linked list}
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82 |
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83 | \subsection{Array}
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84 |
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85 | \subsection{String}
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86 |
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87 | \subsection{Iterator}
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